

THE ECONOMIC LEGACY OF EXPULSION: LESSONS FROM POSTWAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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Abstract

This paper examines the long-run effects of forced migration on economic development in the origin economy, using Czechoslovakia's expulsion of 3 million Germans after WWII. For identification, I use the discontinuity at the border of the "Sudetenland" region where Germans lived. Since Germans had similar characteristics to Czechs, this bypasses factors that might drive effects elsewhere, such as differences in human capital and geography. The expulsion produced persistent disparities in population density, sector composition, and educational attainment. I trace effects to a selective initial resettlement and physical capital extraction after the expulsion, culminating in urban decay and human capital decline.

JEL codes: D74, N34, N94, R12, O15, I25

Key words: Expulsion; forced migration; local development; postwar; nationalism

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1 Introduction

Between 1945 and 1947, 3 million Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia, in one of the largest waves of forced migration in history. Yet this event was hardly unique. Countless others, including millions of Jews, Greeks, and Turks, were likewise uprooted during the 20th century in the process of nation-building, while civil and ethnic conflict have more recently driven large-scale population outflows in places like Uganda, Bosnia, Syria, and Myanmar. A large literature has documented the impact of such events, both on forced migrants, who often experience continued persecution abroad as refugees, and on their host economies ([Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2013](#); [Becker et al, 2020](#)).

What, however, becomes of the places left behind? Comparably little work has been done to understand how forced migration affects the economic development of places *at origin*, i.e. from which the displacement occurred. In this paper, I examine such effects over the long-run, using Czechoslovakia’s expulsion of 3 million Germans after WWII. This event has several features which turn out to be well-suited for identifying the effects of a forced migration event in ways that prior literature has not. Following the collapse of Austria-Hungary into nation-states in 1918, those identifying as German within the Czech lands (i.e. the modern day Czech Republic) were concentrated in one region – the borderlands, or “Sudetenland” – distinguished by a distinct “language border.” Yet after centuries of coexistence and common rule, during which language had held little economic or social significance among the masses, Germans and Czechs were highly similar in terms of their economic and cultural characteristics ([Zahra, 2008](#)). This language border was made formal in 1938 with the Munich Agreement, which paved the way for Germany’s occupation of the Czech lands and in turn Czechoslovakia’s expulsion of its German population in 1945.

My identification strategy exploits the discontinuity in regional exposure to the expulsion at this boundary to identify its relative impact on local economic development over the long-run.¹ To do this, I construct a new dataset of municipal- and district-level data spanning nine decades. Using directories of Czech villages from during the war, I divide the Czech lands into a “borderlands” region where Germans lived prior to the expulsion and an “interior” region in which they largely did not. I then examine economic outcomes in the borderlands, relative to interior areas nearby. To the extent that regions were historically similar at the boundary prior to the expulsion, differences at the boundary thereafter reveal the expulsion’s relative effects.² The prospect of similar treated and control areas also presents a unique

¹Use of ethnic boundaries for empirical identification follows a recent literature, including [Michalopoulos and Papaioannou \(2013\)](#), [Grosfeld et al \(2013\)](#), [Eugster et al \(2017\)](#), and [Moscona et al \(2020\)](#).

²Effects are best described as relative effects, or general equilibrium effects, due to spillovers across regions over time. For instance, the interior was negatively affected via out-migration, while the borderlands has

opportunity to examine the mechanisms through which forced migration affects regional development. In contrast to previous literature, where differences in factors such as local fundamentals and skill composition tend to distinguish displaced populations, driving effects (Acemoglu et al, 2011; Chaney and Hornbeck, 2016), it is not clear in this setting *a priori* whether depopulation will be followed by convergence (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; 2008), with migration restoring pre-existing economic geography at the boundary, or a permanent redistribution of economic activity to unaffected regions (Bosker et al, 2007; Bleakley and Lin, 2012), given the large negative shock to borderland agglomerations. This paper seeks to answer this question and, if it is the latter, chart the precise channels driving persistence.

I begin by combining data on a large set of socioeconomic variables from the interwar period with historical evidence to confirm that places with many Germans and nearby places with few were otherwise highly similar prior to the expulsion on a number of relevant dimensions, such as literacy, income, and sector composition. This is true even if one omits segments of the language border around which the borderlands was more ethnically mixed.

Next, I document large disparities in economic performance today between municipalities on either side of the old German language border, with differences in both the intensity and the composition of economic activity. As of 2011, borderland municipalities had lower population density, higher unemployment, smaller skill-intensive sectors, and lower educational attainment relative to nearby interior municipalities. The magnitudes of effects are robust to changes in bandwidth, running polynomial, fixed effects, and sample restrictions.

Lastly, studying a historical expulsion allows me to shed light on the precise channels through which such differences emerged and persisted. Contrary to policymakers' expectations that former-German areas could be fully and voluntarily resettled by Czechs from the largely unaffected interior, I show that the expulsion was followed by a *selective migratory response*. Settlers disproportionately migrated from interior areas nearby and were rural in origin relative to their more urban destinations, with fewer workers arriving from skilled sectors such as transportation and business relative to agriculture. I argue that this is consistent with agglomeration spillovers keeping relatively urban workers concentrated in the interior after the expulsion. At the same time, I document a large-scale *removal of physical capital* from former-German areas following the expulsion. I argue that this stemmed not from WWII or the Soviet liberation of the Czech lands thereafter, but from an extractive environment engendered by the vacuum of property rights that followed the expulsion. Together, these forces culminated in widespread *urban decay*, with many settlements permanently abandoned, lowered population density, and a shift in sectoral composition toward agriculture in former-German areas, as well as *human capital inequalities* between the re-

likely benefited from market access spillovers in areas near the former German language border.

gions, with relatively lower levels of enrollment in advanced secondary, technical, and tertiary schooling present in the borderlands as early as mid-1947. I also consider other factors such as natural geography, central planning, market access, and Cold War geopolitics.

The borderlands' decline was initially not intended by Czechoslovak policymakers, for whom the region had great economic importance. Yet the expulsion of the Germans had a persistent impact on the places in which they had once lived, relative to other places nearby. These findings provide valuable new insight into the economic effects of forced migration. While voluntary migration has been the subject of vast research and debate (Bell et al, 2013; Abramitzky et al, 2014), migration occurring due to expulsion as well as war and natural disaster is increasingly relevant, with the UN placing the number of forcibly displaced people at 70 million worldwide.³ Moreover, forced migration is often followed by expropriation and conflict. Hence, it may have effects that differ from those of voluntary migration.

This paper makes several contributions to the literature on forced migration. First, whereas existing research has focused largely on the effects of forced migration events for host countries (Hornung, 2014; Schumann, 2014; Braun et al, 2017; Johnson and Koyama, 2017) or on migrants themselves (Bauer et al, 2013; Becker et al, 2020), the findings here provide new evidence that forced migration may affect regional development and contribute to spatial inequality in the origin economy overseeing such displacement (Becker and Ferrara, 2019). This is most similar to Chaney and Hornbeck (2016), who find delayed convergence following the Spanish expulsion of the Moriscos between former-Morisco and non-Morisco districts. As in their paper, studying a politically-motivated expulsion has advantages for identification here, as it is less likely to be associated with selection within the targeted group or the direct destruction of physical capital, relative to war or natural disaster.⁴

Yet unlike this paper, prior research has focused on forced migrations involving relatively skilled or otherwise differentiated groups (Waldinger, 2010; Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel, 2015; Pascali, 2016). To my knowledge, this paper also contributes the first evidence that forced migration can have persistent effects even when treated and control groups are highly similar – in contrast to other settings, in which pre-existing differences were key to driving spatial disparities following treatment (Acemoglu et al, 2011; Chaney and Hornbeck, 2016). Studying this event thus has the potential to speak to a more general class of forced migration events, in which such differences are not always present to impede spatial convergence. Nevertheless, the findings here at times mirror effects observed in other settings.⁵ For instance,

³See <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018>.

⁴An estimated 7000 German civilians were murdered by Czechs during the expulsion, and each expellee was allowed to take about 100 lbs of property (Gerlach, 2017).

⁵Effects also exhibit symmetry with a literature on the *inflows* of refugees and other migrants (Foged and Peri, 2016; Rocha et al, 2017; Droller, 2017; Murard and Sakalli, 2019; Sequeira et al, 2019; Peters, 2019).

Acemoglu et al (2011) find similarly persistent population effects. In contrast, Arbatli and Gokmen (2019) document a *positive* legacy of historical Greek and Armenian human capital externalities in Turkey a century after the expulsions of those relatively high-skilled groups.

A third contribution to the forced migration literature is in documenting the regional economic impact of this significant forced migration event in history. That being said, several working papers study other important aspects of this event, complementing the work here. In particular, Semrad (2015) focuses on the host economies of Sudeten Germans and finds that their arrival in Bavaria generated educational spillovers, while Guzi et al (2019) examine the migratory tendencies of those who resettled the borderlands and find that their settlements tend to be less permanent, stemming from less developed social capital.

Lastly, this paper speaks to broader questions in development and urban economics regarding the importance of historical shocks for long-run development. Empirically, the findings contrast with Davis and Weinstein (2002; 2008), who argue against the empirical relevance of multiple equilibria in economic activity, citing the relatively quick recovery of Japanese cities after WWII.⁶ Yet whereas that shock left property rights and ownership largely intact in affected cities (Nunn, 2014), none displaced by the expulsion here were around to help restore prior economic geography thereafter, leaving a vacuum of property rights in the interim. I argue that this paved the way for large-scale capital extraction, at the expense of regional recovery. This mirrors Oschner (2017), who documents a persistent negative impact of Red Army pillaging of capital after WWII. This potentially offers an alternative explanation for the differential effects of population shocks as noted in Acemoglu et al (2011), who attribute the Holocaust’s persistent effects in Russia to structural changes stemming from compositional differences between expellees and non-expellees. Namely, the persistent effects of shocks may depend on how they affect such fundamental factors as property rights, as in Oschner (2017) as well as Nunn (2008) and Feigenbaum et al (2019).⁷

2 Historical background

The origins of the “Sudeten” Germans in the Czech borderlands can be traced to the 12th century, when early Bohemian kings opened them up to immigration by German-speaking artisans (de Zayas, 1989). They would pay taxes but trade relatively freely, diffusing their language and culture in the process (Agnew, 2004).

⁶On multiple equilibria, see Redding et al (2011), Kline and Moretti (2014), & Jedwab and Moradi (2016).

⁷Property rights for instance may help re-coordinate activity post-shock. See Acemoglu et al (2002), Hornbeck (2010), Tabellini (2010), Dell (2010), and Acemoglu and Dell (2010) on history, institutions, and development, and Maloney and Caicedo (2015), Jedwab et al (2019), Dell and Olken (2019), and Testa (2020) for prior work on how agglomeration economies and institutions may interact to shape spatial development.

After the Thirty Years' War, the Czech lands underwent further "Germanization" under Habsburg rule. During this time, more German speakers moved into the borderlands, creating vast German language frontiers (Daněk, 1995). Yet despite growing German hegemony among the elite, German and Czech speakers coexisted peacefully at the local level, where identity depended more on local kinships than on language (King, 2002; Tampke, 2003). German industries attracted Czech speakers to German towns, creating bilingual economic centers where intermarriage was not uncommon and language choice was largely situational (Agnew, 2004; Zahra, 2008). By the early 1800s, language was largely independent of economic, cultural, or even genetic factors among the masses (King, 2002; Zahra, 2008).

The formation of a German "language border"

Though German and Czech speakers remained well-matched economically, a series of events resulted in their increased segregation within the Czech lands during the following century. From the late 1800s, nationalist activists worked to build exclusive societies by establishing language-based social associations and lobbying for reforms that limited bilingual education (Tampke, 2003; Judson, 2006; Zahra, 2008). These efforts often took on a geographic dimension. Because later Austrian censuses required citizens to select a single language of daily use, German nationalists developed a visual of the borderlands as a distinctly German region and aimed to "Germanize" its mixed elements. Czech nationalists, in contrast, sought to preserve the historic boundaries of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (i.e. the modern day Czech Republic) and built exclusively Czech-language institutions to combat Germanization (Bryant, 2002; Zahra, 2008). As a result, much of activists' efforts focused on the more mixed areas where the borderlands met the Czech interior (Cornwall, 1994). And although the masses remained largely indifferent to national identification, the late 19th century indeed saw greater language assimilation in these places, including declining German speaking in interior areas (Agnew, 2004; Zahra, 2008).

The notion of the borderlands as a formal, German region was further legitimized in 1918 when it was included in official proposals for a new German-Austrian state (Agnew, 2004). When the Allies instead backed Czech efforts to keep historic boundaries intact, the inclusion of 3 million borderland German speakers as a minority group in the new Czechoslovak state further unified them around a cohesive "Sudeten" German identity (Gerlach, 2017). Meanwhile, Czechoslovak policymakers could now use the state to influence the ethnolinguistic composition of the Czech lands. After 1918, a parent's nationality as it appeared on the census determined a child's language of instruction, with minority-language schooling and public services being provided only if a minority group exceeded 20% of the local population (Zahra, 2008; Agnew, 2004). Coinciding with this, census officials could choose nationalities




Figure 1: The distribution of Germans in the Czech lands, post-1918 (Wiskemann, 1938)

for citizens based on “objective” traits and punish failures to comply. In total, German population counts in mixed areas fell by 420,000 (Zahra, 2008). At least officially, over 90% of German speakers in the Czech lands lived in the borderlands in 1930.

Though the interior was largely homogeneously Czech in official statistics after the 1921 census, parts of the borderlands remained highly mixed (see Figure 1), and campaigns to influence the German “language border” continued until its formalization with the Munich Agreement in 1938, which annexed all majority-German areas to Nazi Germany.⁸ Parts of northeast Moravia even became minority-German in later years, as Czechs-identifiers moved to some borderland cities (Cornwall, 1994). However, Hitler’s proposals at Munich ignored this, successfully arguing for Germany’s annexation of borderland villages that had been majority-German in 1910.⁹ In fact, they also called for plebiscites to be held in territories that had never been majority-German, though these never came to fruition (Armstrong, 1939; Goldstein, 1999). The “fuzzy” nature of the language border in some areas, as it pertains to the analysis, is discussed in Section 4.

Comparing Germans and Czechs, 1918-39

Prior to the Munich Agreement, issues of nationality did not dominate the political discourse in Czechoslovakia, and German and Czech societies functioned in relative political and econ-

⁸See Figure A.1 in the Supplemental Material for a map showing annexed territories within Europe.

⁹See Figure A.13 for the MAL overlaid on Figure 1. Zaolzie in Cieszyn Silesia, a largely Polish-speaking area, was also annexed by Poland in 1938. I exclude this latter area.

omy harmony (Tampke, 2003). After centuries of coexistence and common rule, during which language differences had mattered little among the masses, newly-salient national labels remained largely uncorrelated with economic and cultural factors (Zahra, 2008).

For instance, Czechs had parity with Germans in *education* as of the early 1900s (Agnew, 2004; Zahra, 2008). Indeed, education was provided publicly to all by the Czechoslovak government, with parallel curricular structures across all language groups. At the same time, efforts were made to respect national distinctions. History and geography were adapted for different nationalities, and though it was a common elective, students in German-language schools were not obligated to learn Czech (Bach, 1923; Tampke, 2003).

Germans and Czechs also had similar standings in the *labor market* (Zahra, 2008). Though Czechoslovakia made up only a fifth of the Austrian Empire in territory, it constituted two thirds of its industrial capacity, with key production in both the borderlands and interior (Agnew, 2004). Germans deeper in the borderlands did specialize in light industry, such as glassmaking and textile weaving, although even in those sectors the majority of workers were non-German (Gerlach, 2017; U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1947).

Finally, Czechoslovak interwar *institutions* were relatively inclusive, inspired by the Swiss model (Tampke, 2003). Freedom of religion and the press, legal rights, and access to health-care and education were universal across individuals (Bryant, 2002; Tampke, 2003). Group rights were somewhat weaker; facilities were provided for German-language schools and legal activities, but only in > 20% German areas, and Germans participated in parliamentary politics but were not guaranteed proportionate representation (Tampke, 2003; Zahra, 2008).

Such calm was short-lived. During the Great Depression, economic anxiety amplified German concerns about the Czechoslovak state. Export-based industries deep in the borderlands experienced some of the highest unemployment in Czechoslovakia, and many Germans blamed the Czechoslovak government. The separatist Sudeten German Party (SdP) was founded in October of 1933, and although the popular German political parties remained anti-separatist and coalesced with leading Czech parties on common issues in the 1920s, by 1938, 85% of Sudeten Germans supported the SdP (de Zayas, 1989; Glassheim, 2016).

Germany's proximity to the borderlands made its invasion highly likely. In an attempt to avoid war, Allied leaders signed the Munich Agreement, fully formalizing the "Sudetenland" as a region. Meant to appease Germany, annexation severely weakened Czechoslovakia's military and industrial capacities (Agnew, 2004; Glassheim, 2016). Within a few months, Germany had occupied the remainder of the Czech lands, sending its government into exile.

The expulsion of the Sudeten Germans

During the war, exiled Czechoslovak president Edvard Benš established the legal basis for the expulsion of all Germans through several decrees. Thousands of “national committees” were to be set up throughout the borderlands to manage the expulsion, including the confiscation of German property without compensation and its allocation to incoming settlers.

When the war ended in 1945, Allied forces moved into the borderlands to liberate Czechoslovakia, resulting in the first expulsions. It was not until June, however, that they would gain momentum. By summer’s end, 800,000 Germans had been expelled. In August, following the formal Allied approval of the expulsions at Potsdam, all remaining Germans were formally stripped of their citizenship. Another 2.2 million Germans were expelled through mid-1947 ([Gerlach, 2017](#)). These transfers were more systematic in comparison to the earlier “wild transfers.” All borderland residents were suspected of being German. When in doubt, German or Czechoslovak censuses could determine whether one should be expelled. This meant that some Germans who had become Czechs by force prior to the war were not expelled, while some non-Germans who had “switched” to German following annexation were. For others, having an ambiguous or mixed national identity meant being expelled, regardless of census identification ([Zahra, 2008](#); [Spurný, 2013](#)). Only a small number of Germans who were Czech by marriage, could prove their loyalty to the state, or were deemed economically vital were allowed to stay.

By 1950, 3 million Germans had been expelled, mainly to the Western Zones of occupied Germany, along with almost a million to the East Zone and 142,000 to Austria, and only 165,000 Germans remained, of which most would be re-granted citizenship ([Cornwall, 1994](#); *Odsun: Die Vertreibung der Sudetendeutschen, 1995*).

The resettlement of the borderlands

The borderlands’ resettlement was of central importance to the Czechoslovak government, which sought to maintain the region’s prewar output ([Glassheim, 2016](#); [Gerlach, 2017](#)). In May 1945, the Czech borderlands contained upwards of 500,000 non-Germans, and the Czechoslovak government hoped that about 2.5 million more would arrive to resettle the region. Unlike those of other postwar expulsions, this process was to be voluntary. The Czechoslovak government saw this as important for ensuring the elimination of perceived differences between the interior and borderlands, with the hope that confiscated land and property could be used to spur a rapid and full resettlement. Settlers were to be made up solely of Czechs from nearby “interior” areas. However, as labor shortages ensued, policy-makers recruited some Slovaks and others from abroad ([Gerlach, 2017](#)).

Resettlement began in 1945 alongside the expulsion. Early on, resettlement fed back into expulsion, with Germans kept for labor until settlers began to arrive. Various systems and incentives were introduced. Settlers could become “national administrators” of larger firms and farms, with the prospect of eventual ownership. This was established as an interim institution to keep enterprises operating as settlers replaced expellees. To do so, one applied with a national committee with evidence of relevant knowledge or training, although in practice the allocation of property and titles was less careful (Gerlach, 2017). Other incentives were used to attract worker-settlers. Land and houses were sold at low prices;¹⁰ stipends were given to workers in critical industries, such as mining; low interest loans were offered to farmer-settlers; and new regulations were issued, reducing rent in the borderlands relative to the interior by 25% and restricting it to up to 15% of household income for larger families. Ultimately, towns with the most appealing property, larger towns, and those closest to the interior were emptied and resettled most quickly (Daněk, 1995; Gerlach, 2017).

3 The data

This section provides an overview of the district- and municipal-level dataset compiled for this paper. It spans over 90 years and contains newly- and already-digitized data from historical censuses, statistical journals, and demographic yearbooks.

The main “treatment” variable in Section 4 (i.e. located in the borderlands, or former “Sudetenland”) is coded from two directories. As the primary source, I use *Amtliches Deutsches Ortsbuch für das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren*, published in 1940, which lists villages not annexed by Nazi Germany in 1938 (i.e. in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, or interior) by German and Czech name, regional council district (*Oberlandratsbezirk*) and subdistrict (*Bezirk*).¹¹ As a supplementary source, I use *Sudetendeutsches ortsnamenverzeichnis: Amtliches Gemeinde- und Ortsnamenverzeichnis der nach dem Münchener Abkommen vom 29. 9. 1938*, published in 1987, which lists villages in the annexed majority-German borderlands alphabetically by German name, along with their Czech name and government district (*Regierungsbezirk*).¹² With the aid of GIS maps of the Protectorate by Jelínek (2011) and 15,070 modern sub-municipal villages (*části obce*), provided by the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO) via its collaboration with the Czech Land Survey Office (ARCDATA PRAHA), I create a precise “Munich Agreement line” (MAL) to measure the German “language border” and sort modern villages into treatment or control groups (see

¹⁰House prices were about 1 to 3 times annual rent, with 10% due as down payment (Wiedemann, 2016).

¹¹This list can be accessed at <http://www.hartau.de/PBM/Protektorat.html>.

¹²This list can be accessed at http://www.sudeten-by.de/cms/userfiles/downloads/dokumente_nicht-loeschen/Ortsnamen.pdf.




Figure 2: Munich Agreement line (MAL) overlaying municipalities (as of 2011)

Figure 2). I then aggregate this assignment as necessary.

The first Czechoslovak population census was taken in 1921. Decadal censuses have been held ever since except for during WWII. A smaller population index was also compiled for the Czech lands in May 1947. The 1930 census contains information for 330 judicial districts (*soudní okresy*) as well as 151 political districts (*politický okresy*), a superset of judicial districts, on ethnic composition, literacy, and employment by sector. The 1947 index and 1950 census contain data on employment but not literacy or education, with the number of political districts for the former increasing to 163, and judicial and political districts being consolidated in 1949 into 182 districts (*okresy*). The latter also provides the first post-WWII data on ethnic composition (see Table 1). From 1961 to 1991, censuses contain information on ethnic composition, educational attainment, and employment by sector for 76 more-aggregated districts. For the 2001 and 2011 censuses, the number of districts increases to 77 and data are also provided for 6258 and 6251 municipalities (*obce*), respectively.

Most data from the 1930, 2001, and 2011 censuses come from scanned or digital files provided by CZSO. All other district-level census data are made available by the Urban and Regional Laboratory (URRlab) at Charles University in collaboration with the Czech Ministry of Culture, along with corresponding district shapefiles (2017) for each census year. More disaggregated administrative boundary data come from ARCDATA PRAHA (2017).

Non-census pre-expulsion outcome data come from a variety of sources. I construct 1933 variables using data from state social insurance and taxation reports published in 1938. The

former provides the number of registered unemployed in each political district as reported by the Minister of Social Affairs, while the latter lists income and the share of eligible taxpayers by political district. These are combined with data on the size of the labor force and population from the 1930 census to estimate 1933 unemployment and income per capita, respectively. Crime data are from URRLab (2018). Historical railway data are from HGISE (2020), while roads data are digitized from a 1930 map produced by the Autoclub of the Czechoslovak Republic (*Autoklub RČS*), shown in Figure A.5 in the Supplemental Material.

For the post-expulsion period, non-census data are digitized from several statistical reports published from the mid-1940s. District-level data for arable land in 1945 and school enrollment in 1947 are derived from the 1947 and 1948 editions of an annual state statistical report, respectively. Migration data come from demographic yearbooks made available by CZSO. Data on abandoned and destroyed structures and settlements come from zanikleobce.cz (2018). Data on the number of jobless by municipality in 2011 come from the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

4 The regional economic impact of expulsion

After WWII, around 95% of Germans living in the Czech lands (i.e. the modern day Czech Republic) were stripped of their citizenship, property rights, and permanently expelled. This section examines how this impacted former-German places over the long-run. Prior to the expulsion, those still identifying as German within the Czech lands were concentrated in one region: the borderlands, or “Sudetenland”. Although German-speaking had long been prominent in the corners of the Czech lands, historical developments associated with the rise of nationalism resulted in this region becoming semi-formal by the 1920s, defined by a spatial discontinuity in German identification, or “language border,” in official statistics (see Figure 1). This boundary was formalized in 1938, when the Munich Agreement enabled Germany’s annexation of majority-German areas.

Such dramatic variation in German identification allows me to capture differences in exposure to the expulsion across local administrative units (e.g. municipalities, districts) and thus identify the relative effects of the expulsion on the places from which the displacement occurred. While German identification was grounds for an individual’s expulsion throughout the Czech lands, regardless of place,¹³ the *proportion* of individuals identified as German and thus expelled in 1945 jumps discontinuously within the Czech lands at the “Munich

¹³Initially, the borderlands likely retained a larger proportion Germans out of need. By the 1950s, however, remaining Germans had either been expelled or dispersed throughout the Czech lands, often out of the borderlands (Gerlach, 2017). Following this and large inflows of interior Czechs into the borderlands, Table 1 shows that the share of Germans dropped more in the borderlands from 1930-50, albeit from a larger base.

TABLE 1: EXPOSURE TO EXPULSION

Region (subsample)	% German, 1930	% German, 1950
Borderlands (within 25 km of MAL, no overlap)	81.78 (2.276)	4.439 (.597)
Interior (within 25 km of MAL, no overlap)	1.601 (.396)	.495 (.047)
Borderlands (no bandwidth, no overlap)	86.67 (1.646)	6.821 (1.184)
Interior (no bandwidth, no overlap)	1.646 (.418)	.464 (.036)
Borderlands (full sample)	80.874 (1.904)	5.36 (.808)
Interior (full sample)	3.545 (.544)	.569 (.042)

Notes: Units of observation for 1930 are 330 judicial districts. Units of observation for 1950 are 182 districts. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. A district is considered to be in the borderlands (interior) if 50% or more of its area lies inside (outside) the lands annexed by Germany in 1938, as determined by the Munich Agreement line (MAL). The full sample includes districts that overlap the MAL. A district is classified as “no overlap” if >95% of its area lies on one side of the MAL or the other. A district is classified as “within 25 km” if its centroid lies within 25 km of the MAL. As Prague and Polish Zaolzie are always excluded from the analysis, I exclude them here as well.

Agreement line” (MAL), from 1-2% in interior districts to around 80% in borderland ones, as shown in Table 1. By 1950, differences had largely disappeared, due to the expulsion.

I thus define the treatment variable to be a discrete function of a place’s exposure to the expulsion by assigning a value of 1 to any municipality or district that was on the majority-German side of the MAL and a 0 to those in the “interior” where few Germans lived. To the extent that other, potentially confounding factors (i.e. historical shocks besides the expulsion) vary smoothly through the MAL, this will let me identify how places in which the expulsion occurred were in turn affected, relative to otherwise-similar unaffected places. This strategy is similar to spatial regression discontinuity (RD), in that it exploits a discontinuous change in average treatment intensity across space, and is akin to fuzzy RD, in that variation is discontinuous but not binary.¹⁴ However, unlike standard approaches, treatment assignment for administrative units is also non-binary, given the presence of some Germans in many predominantly Czechs regions and vice versa. This is similar to Eugster et al (2017), who use the Swiss language border to capture non-binary cultural variation. As such, I adopt their language and refer to this approach as a “language border contrast” (LBC). Like spatial RD, this requires certain identifying assumptions be met, which I discuss in detail in this section. First, I define the standard, municipal-level equation:

$$y_{mdb} = \alpha + \beta InBorderlands_m + f(location_m) + \mathbf{X}'_m \Gamma + \Sigma_b + \Delta_d + \varepsilon_{mdb}, \quad (1)$$

¹⁴Later robustness checks sharpen the MAL by dropping mixed areas around it, i.e. areas likely to experience pre-treatment sorting thus violating standard RD assumptions, and produce similar estimates.

where y_{mbd} is the outcome variable for municipality m in district d along segment b of the MAL, and $InBorderlands_m$ is the “treatment” dummy denoting whether municipality m lies in the borderlands where most Germans lived.¹⁵ The remaining terms, discussed below, are a running variable, $f(location_m)$; a set of geographic characteristics, $\mathbf{X}_m$; a set of border segment fixed effects, Σ_b ; a set of district fixed effects, Δ_d ; and an error term, ε_{mdb} .

Running variable

The borderlands and interior may exhibit differences in geography, market access, or various historical experiences, confounding estimates. The purpose of the running variable $f(location_m)$ is to capture relevant unobservable characteristics such as these, to the extent that they are “smooth,” i.e. different away from the treatment boundary but constant very close to it, an assumption for which I later argue. If successful, β in equation (1) will estimate effects associated only with the treatment, holding such factors are fixed. In choosing a running variable, many RD designs begin by limiting the sample to a narrow bandwidth around the border of interest. If this is feasible given the sample, then a linear running polynomial is often a good approximation, with minimal noise in estimates (Gelman and Imbens, 2018). As the region of study is quite small in this setting, all samples are easily limited to 50 km of the MAL, and for most specifications I adopt a bandwidth of 25 km.¹⁶

Another important choice is the variable itself. In order to estimate effects *at the boundary*, I adopt as my primary running variable a linear polynomial in *distance from the MAL*, interacted with the treatment. This focuses the analysis on treated areas that are in closest proximity to control areas. Further away from the MAL, differences in fundamentals and other factors such as pre-expulsion labor markets grow, as does the cost of migration for interior Czechs, rendering sustained regional differences post-expulsion less surprising. I also include other covariates, as discussed next, to account for spatial heterogeneities that might influence the effects of being x km from the MAL and, in turn, the estimates of interest.

Another common choice for spatial RD is a two dimensional linear polynomial in *longitude and latitude*. Unlike the former approach, this does not account for differences in slope by treatment status for confounding factors and, as such, may produce biased estimates (Lee and Lumieux, 2010). Furthermore, one cannot overcome this by interacting with the treatment as one would the distance variable, as then treatment effects would not be estimated *at*

¹⁵94 municipalities for which only some parts were annexed are dropped. I define treated as $> 95\%$ area annexed. All specifications and plots exclude those which otherwise overlap the MAL. For 1930-47 analyses, where units are larger such that more area is dropped, results are similar when including units that overlap the MAL but were nonetheless homogeneously German (i.e. treated in spite of overlap) or non-German – about half of units dropped – as shown in Tables A.5 and A.30.

¹⁶Increments of 25 km are standard in the prior literature, as optimal bandwidths vary by outcome.

the MAL. Nevertheless, I follow [Lee and Lumieux \(2010\)](#) and report effects using longitude and latitude for completeness, as secondary estimates. Other estimates using alternative bandwidth and polynomial assumptions are also included in the Supplemental Material.

Covariates and standard errors

The running variable alone may not sufficiently approximate all smooth factors in the presence of significant spatial heterogeneity. For instance, the gradients of unobservables in distance from the MAL may vary by region, or they may be too complex for parametric running polynomials to approximate. I therefore include several additional covariates to supplement the running variable.

First, main regressions control for a set of exogenous, time-invariant geographic characteristics, including elevation, ruggedness, temperature, precipitation, and rivers (km per km²).¹⁷ Although these appear smooth through the MAL, one concern is that they change too sizably or frequently in some regions as one moves away from it, in a manner poorly approximated by a linear trend (see page 44 of the Supplemental Material).¹⁸ To the extent that relevant outcomes are correlated with geography, this could generate false discontinuities in estimates that disappear once these controls are included. Indeed, estimated differences for geographic factors themselves go to zero once I condition on the remaining set of geographic characteristics, as shown in Table 2. That being said, results are generally robust to excluding such controls.¹⁹ Results are also robust to using a restricted sample with only geographically cohesive (i.e. flat) parts of the Czech lands included, as in [Dell \(2010\)](#).

All main empirical specifications also control for unobservable characteristics using border segment fixed effects and thus exploit variation within local regions around the MAL. The importance of this is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows significant economic heterogeneity throughout the Czech lands independent of the MAL locally. The number of segments is chosen with this in mind, with 50 relatively disaggregated segments defined for municipal-level regressions, each about 50 km in length. Specifications with more aggregated units lengthen these to 24 segments for judicial districts, each about 100 km in length, and 16 for political districts (in which judicial districts are nested), about 150 km in length. As having more segments lowers variation used, it is reassuring that results are largely unchanged when using just 8 long border segments for all regressions.²⁰ In regressions that utilize municipal-

¹⁷See [Dell \(2010\)](#) and [Eugster et al \(2017\)](#) for similar border analyses utilizing controls.

¹⁸Also see Table A.2 in the Supplemental Material for unconditional local means and Table A.6 for regressions of geographic variables with running variables but no other geographic controls.

¹⁹Some coefficients, such as for population density, grow in the expected direction, given the more rugged nature of the borderlands on average. See Tables A.6, A.13, and A.31 in the Supplemental Material.

²⁰See Tables A.8, A.17, and A.32 in the Supplemental Material.




Figure 3: Heatmaps for population density, % employment in agriculture, % employment in business, and % employment in industry in 1930 (clockwise from top left). *Notes:* Darker shades indicate larger values.

level data, I also include district fixed effects. These are potentially important, as the 77 districts were key governing entities until 2003 with dominion over public goods, such as major roads and secondary education (OCED, 2006).

Standard errors are clustered at the district (or political district) level.²¹ This is motivated by the role of districts as governing units, such that municipal characteristics are likely to be correlated within districts. Alternative approaches, including Conley standard errors and border segments as clusters, produce similar results (see Table A.18).

Balance testing

In this subsection, I provide evidence that borderland and interior areas were alike *at the MAL* in relevant ways prior to the expulsion. Though not essential for the expulsion to have had real and identifiable effects, it focuses the analysis on treated and control areas that are highly similar aside from their difference in expulsion experience. This is advantageous for two reasons. First, it suggests that regions were not differentially exposed to historical shocks prior to the expulsion that might instead be driving long-run effects. Second, pre-existing differences have the potential to interact with the treatment in general equilibrium.

²¹In regressions with political districts for units, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.

TABLE 2: PRE-EXPULSION ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REGIONS

	%German	Literacy rate	ln Pop. density	Labor force part.	Unemploy- ment rate	Income _{pc}
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)	(1d)	(1e)	(1f)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	67.968 (6.042)***	-.222 (.217)	-.318 (.208)	-.400 (1.196)	-3.936 (2.535)	-1.866 (1.832)
R^2	.933	.533	.475	.623	.69	.409
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	73.575 (3.853)***	.264 (.152)*	-.108 (.116)	.631 (.769)	1.781 (1.490)	-.392 (1.490)
R^2	.933	.515	.482	.633	.645	.387
Mean dep. var. in interior	1.601 (3.760)	98.385 (.669)	4.764 (.733)	45.386 (4.622)	9.791 (10.028)	9.428 (4.661)
Observations	165	165	165	165	104	104
Clusters	98	98	98	98	—	—
Border segments	24	24	24	24	16	16
Bandwidth	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	50 km	50 km
Year	1930	1930	1930	1930	1933	1933
	%Taxpayers	Convicts _{pc} , 1923-27	%Roma	%Jewish	Roads (km) per sq. km	Rail (km) per sq. km
	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(2d)	(2e)	(2f)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	.006 (.604)	-.454 (.683)	-.002 (.002)	-.113 (.140)	.014 (.016)	.005 (.009)
R^2	.562	.361	.1	.324	.311	.393
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	.391 (.484)	.230 (.484)	-.001 (.001)	.064 (.068)	.004 (.011)	.010 (.008)
R^2	.541	.337	.112	.328	.302	.406
Mean dep. var. in interior	5.680 (1.981)	7.273 (2.058)	.001 (.006)	.182 (.477)	.216 (.074)	.096 (.065)
Observations	105	164	165	165	271	271
Clusters	—	98	98	98	107	107
Border segments	16	24	24	24	24	24
Bandwidth	50 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km
Year	1933	1923-27	1930	1930	1930	1930
	Elevation	Ruggedness	Precipitation	Temperature	Rivers (km) per sq. km	% Arable land, 1945
	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(2d)	(2e)	(2f)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	.509 (2.630)	.064 (.245)	.108 (.233)	.001 (.016)	-.061 (.048)	.279 (4.542)
R^2	.994	.58	.978	.993	.336	.707
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	.112 (1.743)	.059 (.243)	.452 (.236)*	.002 (.009)	-.007 (.048)	-1.340 (3.664)
R^2	.995	.585	.982	.995	.333	.716
Mean dep. var. in interior	398.881 (133.667)	6.093 (2.840)	53.104 (6.839)	7.650 (.709)	1.141 (.527)	.567 (.917)
Observations	4049	4049	4049	4049	4049	115
Clusters	71	71	71	71	71	—
Border segments	50	50	50	50	50	16
Bandwidth	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	50 km

Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. *Notes:* All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include border segment fixed effects as well as exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km²), except when used as an outcome variable, and utilize a local linear running variable of either distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment or longitude and latitude. Units of observation are judicial districts, except unemployment, income, and taxpayers, which use political districts, a superset of judicial districts; time-invariant geographic outcomes, which use municipalities; and road and railway densities, which use judicial districts “parts,” derived in ArcGIS according to the “split sample analysis” described in the Supplemental Material. Average 1933 income per capita is in units of 100 Czechoslovak koruna. Average convicts per capita indicates the number of convicted offenders in Czech criminal districts between 1923 and 1927 as a proportion of the total population in 1930. All shares are out of 100.

TABLE 3: PRE-EXPULSION SECTORAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REGIONS

	Agricultural sector	Mining and extraction	Metals	Machinery and auto	Glass	Textiles
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)	(1d)	(1e)	(1f)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	2.915 (3.649)	-1.150 (1.698)	.455 (1.458)	-.421 (.561)	1.065 (1.681)	-3.311 (2.534)
R^2	.526	.376	.313	.298	.338	.634
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	-1.264 (2.577)	-.982 (.970)	-.414 (.911)	-.697 (.324)**	.230 (.479)	.758 (1.552)
R^2	.535	.395	.339	.311	.35	.64
Mean dep. var. in interior	30.713 (12.800)	3.510 (4.568)	4.818 (3.793)	2.631 (2.187)	.674 (1.891)	5.586 (9.646)
	Other industry	Con- struction	Transport sector	Finance and insurance	Trade	Other service
	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(2d)	(2e)	(2f)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	.102 (1.429)	.500 (.719)	-.457 (.665)	-.110 (.094)	-.534 (.796)	-.355 (.927)
R^2	.315	.332	.318	.258	.377	.209
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	-.702 (1.062)	.339 (.568)	-.114 (.420)	-.015 (.056)	.498 (.416)	.722 (.643)
R^2	.275	.336	.321	.245	.356	.175
Mean dep. var. in interior	14.895 (5.403)	6.744 (1.862)	3.560 (2.153)	.430 (.350)	5.151 (1.722)	6.394 (3.662)
Observations	165	165	165	165	165	165
Clusters	98	98	98	98	98	98
Border segments	24	24	24	24	24	24
Bandwidth	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km
Year	1930	1930	1930	1930	1930	1930

Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. *Notes:* All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include border segment fixed effects as well as exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km²), and utilize a local linear running variable of either distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment or longitude and latitude. Units of observation are judicial districts. All outcomes represent the share (out of 100) of the labor force in a sector.

For example, if Germans and Czechs worked in very different sectors, or if places with many Germans had very different natural factors, then the set of Czechs who could feasibly resettle those areas in the short-run would be more limited, diminishing the prospect of long-run convergence at the boundary.

Section 2 detailed how, following centuries of admixture and common rule, Germans and Czechs exhibited few occupational or social differences in the early 1900s, with the developments that gave rise to the MAL and eventual expulsion rooted in national rather than economic considerations (Zahra, 2008). To test this, I examine whether the MAL and the ethnolinguistic differences for which it was drawn were associated prior to the expulsion with differences in factors such as education, labor market factors, and institutions at the MAL, where other relevant factors such as natural geography are fixed.

I begin by reaffirming that the MAL identifies German identification and thus exposure to the expulsion. Table 2 shows that traversing the MAL was associated with an increase of about 68 percentage points (pp) in the German population in 1930. In contrast, it coincides with statistically significant differences for no other factor in primary specifications.

First, Czech- and German speakers in the Czech lands appear to be “well-matched” in terms of *education*, consistent with the historical evidence laid out in Section 2, with literacy rates in 1930 of around 98% on both sides of the MAL (Zahra, 2008, 18). Despite some regional differences in educational content, this reflects the high educational standards of the Czechoslovak system with respect to all individuals.

Pre-expulsion *labor markets* also exhibit smoothness through the MAL, a fact that speaks favorably to the potential resettlement of the borderlands by nearby interior Czechs. Consistent with the historical literature, sectors do not appear to vary significantly at the MAL in Table 3, including for German-dominated industries overall such as glassworks and textile manufacturing. Unemployment, which affected German-speaking areas closer to Germany more severely during the Depression, is likewise smooth through the MAL, where the industrial composition of Czech- and German speakers was more similar, as are other labor market outcomes such as income. One exception is the machine and auto industry, which exhibits a decrease in the secondary specification, although no other running variable assumptions generate such significance.²² These alternative specifications as well as plots of all outcome variables are available in the Supplemental Material.

Lastly, though more difficult to test, the results here are consistent with the historical literature in downplaying local differences in *institutions*. The relative egalitarianism of the Czech lands across ethnic groups is apparent in the regions’ similar taxation and criminal conviction levels, as shown above. Another indicator of such egalitarianism comes from examining market access, as measured by transport availability. As it is plausible that major road and rail connections might have been fewer in the borderlands, I examine balance tests for both major roads and railways per square km. A lack of smoothness would likely have had implications for long-run effects, as transport integration would have been key to minimizing differences between the regions after the expulsion. Table 2 shows both to be highly smooth through the MAL as of 1930. Estimates are similar for rails using data from 1940, but, as that data are less reliable, I do not feature them here.²³ Figure A.4 in the Supplemental Material maps these connections for both years, while Figure A.5 shows major roads in 1930.

²²Some estimates, namely for population density, are likely to be correlated with geography and indeed gain in significance when these controls are dropped, showcasing their importance. For these estimates, see Table A.6 in the Supplemental Material.

²³This is according to the creators of the dataset (HGISE, 2020). For completeness, I do include the 1940 estimates in Table A.35 in the Supplemental Material; they are similar.

Overall, these results corroborate the notion that Germans and Czechs in the Czech lands were highly similar after centuries of coexistence, as argued by historians – as well as by the Nazis during WWII (Bryant, 2007).

Other concerns: WWII, pre-treatment sorting, and borderland Czechs

The same nationalism that motivated the expulsion also inspired the annexation of the borderlands and occupation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany a few years prior. Yet one concern is that such events and others during WWII might have differentially affected borderland areas near the MAL. Indeed, a major limitation in studying this era is the lack of data from during the war. I address these concerns here.

Following annexation and occupation, the Czech government was exiled and preferential treatment of the Czech regions by the Nazis during the war would have favored the borderlands, biasing estimates toward zero. That being said, both the borderlands and interior experienced little physical destruction during the war, with Czech civilian casualties from such of about 10,000 (Erlikhman, 2004).²⁴ There were also few acts of resistance by Czechs. Czechs made up a large and important industrial workforce, and Nazi officials saw much of the Czech masses as “Germanizable” due to their cultural and genetic proximity. Thus, life in the Czech interior continued largely as normal, avoiding much of the violence experienced by Yugoslavia and Poland (Agnew, 2004; Bryant, 2007; Glassheim, 2016). Economic life in the borderlands also changed little, at the displeasure of some borderland Germans, who had sought greater integration into the German economy and society. In all, “Czechoslovakia emerged from the war with much of its industrial base intact” (Gerlach, 2017, 208).

Differences in military deaths are more difficult to discern. Historical accounts suggest the borderlands suffered more in terms of war casualties than the interior, due to conscription of Sudeten Germans. A more recent estimate by Overmans (2004) places the number of German war dead from all annexed territories, including annexed Poland, at 206,000. However, counts are complicated by the fact that many deaths occurred during the violent liberation of Czechoslovakia in May 1945, which also marked the first expulsions. Separately, many Jews and Roma were expelled from or murdered in the Czech lands during this time. However, these groups were distributed uniformly through the MAL, as shown in Table 2.²⁵ Thus, pre-1945 casualty rate differences between the regions were likely small on net.

Another concern is related to the non-binary nature of treatment assignment. Unlike the interior, which by 1930 was strikingly homogeneous (at least officially), some parts of

²⁴Sudeten German civilian casualty counts are uncertain, but few bombs struck the borderlands. See Figure A.3 for a map of confirmed Allied WWII bombings. See Table A.3 for more on casualty estimates.

²⁵Estimates are similar if we instead use a measure of Jewish *religious* identification; see Figure A.6 in the Supplemental Material for this data plotted.

the borderlands were quite mixed, especially near the MAL. Some of this was rooted in *pre-treatment sorting* by Czechs. According to historians, such migrations occurred several times – first by interior Czechs immigrating to some borderland cities after 1918, then by 300,000 of the 730,000 borderland Czechs into the interior during the war, and finally by nearly all of those Czechs back into the borderlands after the war (Cornwall, 1994; Agnew, 2004; Glassheim, 2016). This could bias effects if it was driven by relevant factors.

Pre-treatment sorting, and the presence of borderland Czechs more broadly, may also make balance tests less useful for evaluating the historical similarity of more and less treated areas, as it would mean that cross-region differences are not necessarily informative of cross-ethnic differences. For example, if Czechs near the MAL were in fact less skilled than Germans, borderland Czechs could bias estimated literacy differences from positive to zero.

How can one determine the importance of pre-treatment sorting and borderland Czechs in driving pre-expulsion similarities as well as effects? Since I cannot compare Czechs and Germans directly, I rely on heterogeneity in the ethnic composition of the borderlands prior to the expulsion to better compare Czechs and Germans at the MAL. In particular, I reexamine the balance tests above using a sample of “discrete” stretches of the MAL, in which I compare only homogeneous parts of the interior with nearby, homogeneous parts of the borderlands with few borderland Czechs (and thus little pre-treatment sorting).

In Table A.7 in the Supplemental Material, I show that while this increases the size of the ethnic discontinuity to 86 pp, estimates regarding relative literacy, population density, and sector composition change little. One exception, eligible taxpayers, now shows a statistically significant increase from crossing MAL in both specifications tested, of 1.6 eligible taxpayers per 100 persons. Yet Czechs and Germans overall still appear quite similar as compared across homogeneous districts. Moreover, long-run effects do not appear to be biased by pre-treatment sorting or the presence of borderland Czechs, with full and discrete samples yielding similar results.²⁶ This reaffirms the notion that Czechs, Germans, and their respective places were similar in relevant ways prior to the expulsion, at least at the MAL.²⁷

4.1 Long-run effects

I will now provide evidence that the expulsion of the Germans had long-lasting effects on the “borderland” areas from which the displacement occurred and, in turn, the spatial distribution of economic activity within the Czech lands. I will focus on two types of outcomes:

²⁶See Table A.16 in the Supplemental Material. I also estimate pre-trends at the MAL using both full and discrete samples, as shown in Table A.11. Development trajectories of Germans and Czechs between 1921-30 are overall similar, aside from some relative increases in literacy among Germans.

²⁷And in addition to the kinds of pre-treatment sorting discussed above, this exercise reaffirms that the kind in which Germans “switched” to Czech also would likely not have mattered.

TABLE 4: LONG-RUN DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 2011

	ln Population density (1a)	ln Labor force density (1b)	Unemployment rate (1c)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	-.312 (.095)***	-.317 (.097)***	2.729 (.546)***
R^2	.398	.399	.404
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	-.251 (.084)***	-.253 (.086)***	3.623 (.520)***
R^2	.4	.4	.398
Mean dep. var. in interior	4.034 (.885)	3.294 (.911)	10.492 (4.809)
Observations	4049	4049	4049
Clusters	71	71	71
Border segments	50	50	50
Bandwidth	25 km	25 km	25 km
Year	2011	2011	2011

Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. *Notes:* All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include border segment and district fixed effects as well as exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km²), and utilize a local linear running variable of either distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment or longitude and latitude. Units of observation are municipalities.

(i) the intensity of economic activity, as measured by population and employment, and (ii) the composition of economic activity, as measured by education and occupation.

Prior to the expulsion, borderland populations were as skilled and prosperous as their interior neighbors. If the determinants of economic activity are invariant to the expulsion, then one would expect to see interior Czechs spilling over into relatively similar, nearby borderland areas in smooth ways thereafter. Instead, borderland municipalities today show signs of marked economic decline relative to interior towns a few miles away. As of 2011, population and employment remain more concentrated in the interior, as shown in Table 4. In fact, borderland towns have seen some of the highest unemployment rates in the Czech Republic, which has relatively low unemployment overall. Column (1c) shows that simply crossing the MAL is associated with a 3 percentage point (pp) increase in the municipal unemployment rate, about a 30% increase from the rate in nearby interior areas. This illustrates the extent to which production remains less likely to locate in the borderlands, nearly seven decades after the expulsion and over two decades since transition.

Table 5 suggests that this stems from compositional differences between the regions. In contrast to Table 3, the borderlands today exhibits significantly lower employment in several skill-intensive sectors, relative to nearby interior areas. For example, the share of the labor force working in finance declines by about 25% on average upon crossing the MAL into the borderlands, while employment in healthcare and education on average see decreases of

TABLE 5: LONG-RUN DIFFERENCES IN SECTORAL COMPOSITION, 2011

	Agricultural sector	Industry	Con- struction	Transport sector	Finance and insurance	Hospitality
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)	(1d)	(1e)	(1f)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	-.573 (.433)	-.621 (.860)	-.447 (.267)*	-.117 (.248)	-.369 (.080)***	.365 (.280)
R^2	.303	.34	.155	.19	.134	.339
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	-.752 (.457)	-1.132 (.717)	-.136 (.223)	-.034 (.244)	-.386 (.073)***	.440 (.234)*
R^2	.304	.340	.154	.191	.134	.344
Mean dep. var. in interior	7.653 (6.576)	26.672 (7.489)	7.212 (3.197)	5.309 (2.664)	1.408 (1.273)	2.119 (1.587)
	Auto trade and repair	Public	Commun- ications	Education	Healthcare	Other service
	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(2d)	(2e)	(2f)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	-.864 (.282)***	.001 (.274)	-.297 (.089)***	-.864 (.176)***	-.993 (.230)***	-.219 (.166)
R^2	.201	.125	.204	.085	.139	.214
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	-.933 (.252)***	-.310 (.232)	-.381 (.082)***	-.791 (.145)***	-.780 (.233)***	-.411 (.134)***
R^2	.201	.123	.202	.085	.139	.211
Mean dep. var. in interior	7.959 (3.311)	4.476 (2.371)	1.294 (1.272)	4.203 (2.297)	4.676 (2.797)	4.515 (2.650)
Observations	4049	4049	4049	4049	4049	4049
Clusters	71	71	71	71	71	71
Border segments	50	50	50	50	50	50
Bandwidth	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km
Year	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011

Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. *Notes:* All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include border segment and district fixed effects as well as exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km²), and utilize a local linear running variable of either distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment or longitude and latitude. Units of observation are municipalities. All outcomes represent the share (out of 100) of the labor force in a sector.

about 20%. In contrast, employment shares in agriculture and other relatively low-skilled trades remain similar on both sides of the MAL nearly seven decades after the expulsion.

These differences suggest a lower concentration of skill in borderland areas relative to neighboring interior towns. The next set of estimates in this section, in Table 6, suggest this to be the case. The results are striking: I observe a 4.9 pp increase – about a standard deviation – in the adult (i.e. age 15 or over) population with no more than a primary education associated with crossing the MAL into the borderlands. This is met by a 3.9 pp decrease in secondary schooling and a 1.9 pp decrease in tertiary education, such as college.²⁸

Results do not meaningfully change if one considers only geographically cohesive or previ-

²⁸Employment and education coefficients do not add up to zero due to non-reporting also being higher in the borderlands. For instance, the residual category for employment as a share of the labor force produces a coefficient of 2.27 (.36). For education, it is .98 (.19).

TABLE 6: LONG-RUN DIFFERENCES IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, 2011

	% Primary education or less	% Secondary education	% Tertiary education
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	4.883 (.634)***	-3.923 (.516)***	-1.936 (.391)***
R^2	.297	.199	.271
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	4.965 (.543)***	-3.759 (.453)***	-2.270 (.391)***
R^2	.298	.201	.269
Mean dep. var. in interior	20.767 (4.980)	66.939 (4.827)	8.716 (3.926)
Observations	4049	4049	4049
Clusters	71	71	71
Border segments	50	50	50
Bandwidth	25 km	25 km	25 km
Year	2011	2011	2011

Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include border segment and district fixed effects as well as exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km²), and utilize a local linear running variable of either distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment or longitude and latitude. Units of observation are municipalities. All outcomes represent the share (out of 100) of the adult (age 15+) population with up to that level of education.

ously homogeneous parts of the Czech lands, reaffirming that geography and the non-binary treatment assignment are not driving effects. Results are also robust to using longer or no border segments, dropping district fixed effects, dropping controls, modifying bandwidth and running variable assumptions, clustering by border segment, and using Conley standard errors with various bandwidths (see Tables A.12-18 in the Supplemental Material).

5 Channels

The previous section documented relatively depressed levels of economic activity in the Czech borderlands, nearly 70 years after its German population was expelled. This section investigates the channels through which regional disparities originated. Since no “unevenness” was present prior to the expulsion, I begin by examining the economic activity of those who voluntarily *resettled* the borderlands from interior areas immediately following the expulsion, relative to those who did not. Indeed, the expulsion’s impact on the borderlands’ relative development depended on it being resettled in a quick and convergent manner. Because the expulsion was near-absolute (i.e about 95% of Germans), I can use data from after the expulsion and the borderlands’ initial resettlement had largely concluded in mid-1947




Figure 4: Spatial distribution of economic activity around Munich Agreement line, 2011. *Notes:* Negative distance = interior; positive distance = borderlands.

to compare these populations.²⁹ This will also allow me to establish whether or not key structural changes had occurred prior to the advent of central planning in 1948. I then use longer-run data to study the subsequent persistence of effects.

In this section, I show that the expulsion was instead followed by a (i) *selective initial resettlement*. Settlers disproportionately migrated from interior areas nearby and were rural in origin relative to their more urban destinations, with fewer workers arriving from skilled sectors such as business relative to agriculture. I argue that this is consistent with agglomeration economies keeping relatively urban workers concentrated in the interior after the expulsion. Simultaneously, I document a large-scale (ii) *loss of physical capital* in former-German areas following the expulsion. I argue that this stemmed not from WWII or the Soviet liberation of the Czech lands thereafter, but from an extractive environment engendered by the vacuum of property rights that followed the expulsion. Together, these factors culminated in (iii) *urban decay*, with many settlements permanently abandoned, lowered population density, and a shift in sectoral composition toward agriculture in former-German areas, as well as (iv) *human capital inequalities* between the regions thereafter. While this analysis will focus on the events of the immediate post-expulsion period, during which the

²⁹The historical literature indicates that the 5% or so remaining were largely skilled workers initially kept out of need, potentially downward biasing 1947 estimates slightly.

Czechoslovak economy remained generally unplanned, I will also discuss how these patterns evolved during the communist period and following transition to a market economy in 1989.

5.1 Selective resettlement

The effects of the expulsion – on former-German areas but also in general equilibrium – depended on the German population first being replaced by interior settlers, in both count and composition. The stated goal of resettlement was that it be geographically *convergent*: since the expulsion “would reduce the Czechoslovakia population by 25%, the borderlands would only be resettled up to 75% of [its] original population,” preserving prewar *relative* densities while creating one homogeneous nation (Radvanovský, 2001, 203). This was to be done quickly and concurrently with the expulsion, with the goal of maintaining the region’s output (Glassheim, 2016). It was also to be carried out on a voluntary basis. Policymakers used German property, confiscated without payment and reallocated at low rates, in addition to various incentives, as discussed in Section 2. Besides such interventions, worker and firm-level decisions remained unplanned until the communist coup of 1948 (Bernàšek, 1970).

Under such circumstances, one possible migratory response to the expulsion would be a convergent one, at least at the MAL, with interior Czechs migrating to replace Germans with relatively similar labor endowments. Indeed, one might expect the expulsion to have made the borderlands an attractive place in which to settle and invest, given its proximity, factor similarities, and the large amounts of former-German land and property available there.

As it turns out, the expulsion *was* met with a large-scale migratory response, beginning in mid-1945 through the first half of 1947. However, this initial resettlement was *selective* in nature, in both (i) location and (ii) occupation. To see this, one can compare population losses endured by the interior (i.e. to the voluntary resettling of the borderlands) with those of borderland areas (i.e. from the expulsion net of resettlement) along these dimensions.

Locational selection among settlers

Understanding where Czech migrants settled within the borderlands after the expulsion, as well as from where they originated in the interior, is of primary importance for understanding how the expulsion affected not just former-German areas, but the economic geography of the Czech lands overall. To do this, I construct an outcome variable to measure population losses in each judicial district d between the 1930 census and mid-1947 index:

$$PopChange_d = \frac{Pop_{d,1947} - Pop_{d,1930}}{Pop_{d,1930}}.$$




Figure 5: Sources of immigration to Northern Bohemia, 1945-7 (von Arburg, 2001)

To the extent that nearby borderland and interior districts had similar characteristics and trends prior to the expulsion, including few shocks of permanence or scale during WWII, the convergent migratory response envisioned by policymakers would have required that such losses be similar for each region by the time expulsion and the borderlands' initial resettlement had wound down in mid-1947, relative to pre-expulsion levels.

In addition to the treatment dummy indicating a district's region, I exploit two further measures of location to predict population dynamics: (i) distance from the MAL and (ii) being within 25 km of a city with 50,000+ residents in 1930, both of which I interact with the treatment, and where applicable each other, to allow for heterogeneous effects.

The baseline results in Table 7 show a lack of convergence at the MAL in mid-1947, contrary to policymaker expectations: while both regions lost in population on net, borderland districts had still lost about 13.5 pp more on average post-resettlement than nearby interior districts.³⁰ As one moves away from the MAL, interior losses shrink, suggesting resettlement to be driven by interior settlers coming from near the MAL. This is consistent with the historical narrative, as illustrated in Figure 5. I also consider specifications with a 50 km bandwidth to evaluate trends beyond the 25 km bandwidth. These, in columns (2), show population losses to also be growing more in the borderlands further from the MAL. Altogether, this suggests that *location-specific human capital* may have been important in driving resettlement, with Czechs migrating from interior areas with similar factor endowments.

³⁰While it is possible that more settlers coming from abroad or Slovakia were of those sectors, these made up a tiny fraction of settlers and would only have made the borderlands' relative declines appear smaller.

TABLE 7: REGIONAL POPULATION LOSS PATTERNS, 1930 TO MID-1947

	<i>PopChange_d</i>			
	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	-13.538 (2.991)***	-15.621 (3.164)***	-16.407 (2.104)***	-18.670 (2.106)***
In borderlands× Dist. to MAL	.066 (.229)	.146 (.256)	-.201 (.089)**	-.172 (.090)*
In borderlands× Near urban ₃₀	–	12.839 (6.630)*	–	16.721 (4.591)***
Distance to MAL	-.430 (.128)***	-.418 (.150)***	-.179 (.067)***	-.158 (.069)**
Near urban ₃₀	–	4.743 (4.566)	–	-1.752 (3.072)
<i>R</i> ²	.830	.846	.799	.809
In borderlands (linear in <i>x</i> and <i>y</i>)	-21.055 (1.760)***	-22.573 (1.822)***	-22.009 (2.064)***	-23.627 (2.086)***
In borderlands× Near urban ₃₀	–	8.061 (3.555)**	–	9.236 (3.518)***
Near urban ₃₀	–	3.961 (2.242)*	–	3.750 (2.260)*
<i>R</i> ²	.816	.831	.786	.809
Mean dep. var. in interior	-12.564 (7.333)		-10.818 (11.753)	
Observations	165	165	258	258
Clusters	98	98	134	134
Border segments	24	24	24	24
Bandwidth	25 km	25 km	50 km	50 km

Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. *Notes:* All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include border segment fixed effects as well as exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km²), and utilize a local linear running variable of either distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment or longitude and latitude. Regressions with the first running variable always feature three-way interactions whenever the “near urban” dummy present. “Distance to MAL” interacted with the treatment denotes moving into the borderlands away from the MAL, while non-interacted it denotes moving within the interior *toward* the MAL. To be “near urban” is to be within 25 km of a city that had 50,000 residents or more in 1930. A coefficient of -10 for “in borderlands” implies that, from the combined expulsion and resettlement, the average borderland district’s population declined 10 percentage points more (on net) than the average nearby interior district’s population. Units of observation are judicial districts.

Convergence was also more likely conditional on borderland districts being more urban historically. These results, also in Table 7, show that this was not driven by urban interior residents moving to urban borderlands; only for the borderlands is this interaction term consistently significant.³¹ This suggests a larger proportion of *rural* interior workers moving to *urban* borderland areas – and bringing relatively rural labor endowments with them.

Overall, these patterns are consistent with the historical literature, with settlers selecting into larger towns and those closest to the interior, at the expense of rural borderland areas and those closer to international borders (Daněk, 1995; Gerlach, 2017; Radvanovský, 2001).

³¹I use a 25,000 population threshold in Table A.19. Results are similar, though urban effects are weaker.




Figure 6: Population change around Munich Agreement line by sector, 1930-47. *Notes:* Negative distance = interior; positive distance = borderlands.

Occupational selection among settlers

Given the above findings, it is unsurprising that migratory sorting also occurred on sectoral lines. This can be seen in Figure 6, which charts $PopChange_d$ overall and by sector, both at and away from the MAL. These show differences in worker losses around the MAL were relatively small for agriculture and large for other, more “urban” sectors such as business. This is consistent with the historical narrative that settlers were disproportionately unskilled farmers, with settlement initiatives struggling to attract skilled workers while interior areas suffered shortages in agricultural labor (Radvanovský, 2001; Gerlach, 2017). Differences in net losses between regions again shrink as one approaches the MAL. LBC estimates can be

found in Table A.20 in the Supplemental Material.³²

The sources of the patterns in this section are undoubtedly multifarious. In the presence of agglomeration economies, for instance, such a large population shock would have generated a massive spatial coordination problem for the remaining population, potentially *decreasing* the expected relative return to migrating to borderland towns for workers in urban sectors in the short-run – albeit less so where locational fundamentals were similar and where settlements were more populous historically (Allen and Donaldson, 2018). Moreover, with a convergent initial resettlement inhibited, such “core-periphery” regional patterns could become locked in (Krugman, 1991, Puga, 1999). Indeed, data from the 1930s suggest the presence of strong agglomeration economies throughout the pre-expulsion Czech lands, with population density strongly positively correlated with income and employment in industry, transport, and business, and negatively with employment in agriculture, consistent with the selection above.³³ That being said, this need not be the entire story, as I will argue now.

5.2 Physical capital extraction

Unlike voluntary outmigration events, forced migrations – including both expulsions and those from natural disaster – often entail large amounts of property and capital left behind. This was the case here, as German expellees were allowed to bring little with them. Although confiscation of property was intended to help spur a convergent migratory response, it likely *complicated* early resettlement efforts, helping to generate the patterns observed above.

Although such property was intended to be sold and transferred to incoming settlers, in the interim this vacuum of property rights was exploited by local authorities, as well as appropriative Czechs called “gold-diggers” (*zlatokopové*), who saw the borderlands not as a place to settle but as a free lunch in its mobile assets. Historians have written extensively on how this helped crowd out the reemergence of production in the borderlands and left it with a “Wild West”-like character. As a result, the borderlands often failed to attract or retain productive workers, which in turn fed into the concentration of economic activity in interior areas (Radvanovský, 2001; Glassheim, 2016; Gerlach, 2017).

Such extraction did not end there. The expulsion also enabled state officials to expand their political and economic powers. Prior to the 1948 coup, the communists oversaw the

³²Other compositional factors, such as sex, were not selected upon, although historians have noted that settlers tended to be younger (Gerlach, 2017). I find no evidence in the 1947 data of selection on sex, though I do estimate a 7.8 (1.1) pp increase from crossing the MAL in the share of the population that is under the age of 15 in mid-1947, something not present in the 1930 data.

³³Table A.21 shows these correlations, with magnitudes independent of region. Figure A.11 also shows a significant degree of localization along sector lines in 1930, with industry featuring prominently in Northern Moravia and business in Northern Bohemia, which would have been severely disrupted by the expulsion.




Figure 7: Abandoned or destroyed industrial structures

structure of the property allocation process, which lent them popularity among some settlers. The party won a plurality of seats for the first time in the 1946 elections, due to its new base of support in the borderlands, where it won three fourths of the vote (Radvanovský, 2001). Hence, the expulsion served as a source of patronage and legitimacy for them. In fact, historians consider the expulsion to have been key, if not necessary, for the communist takeover (Glassheim, 2001; Tampke, 2003). From there, historians have documented how the communist regime extracted from the borderlands. The liquidation and relocation of mills, machinery, and other physical capital from under-settled borderland areas further aided in the decline of many towns (Radvanovský, 2001; Gerlach, 2017). Others were uprooted to extract raw materials beneath them (Glassheim, 2016). Soon “empty factory buildings [dotted] the borderlands like gravestones” (Gerlach, 2017, 258).

Figure 7 illustrates this effect, using spatial data from the ongoing *Zaniklé obce a objekty* (2018) project. The aim of this project is to document abandoned and destroyed sites in the Czech lands, with observations stemming not just from the expulsion but from throughout history. Yet given that records of capital loss were not kept during the expulsion, this dataset provides a unique opportunity to visualize how the expulsion impacted borderland capital. In particular, one can use the LBC approach to examine whether there is more observed loss of relevant physical capital associated with former-German areas. To do this, I use the dataset to derive a measure of capital loss, an indicator for whether a municipality contains abandoned or destroyed mills, mines, quarries, factories, breweries, or distilleries. I also consider the loss of other urban structures (rail stations, hotels and inns, cottages, churches,

TABLE 8: OBSERVED CAPITAL LOSS

	Capital loss		Other urban loss	
	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	.125 (.029)***	–	.043 (.022)*	–
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	–	.130 (.028)***	–	.077 (.018)***
R^2	.253	.256	.272	.269
Mean dep. var. in interior	.088 (.284)		.068 (.252)	
Observations	4049	4049	4049	4049
Clusters	71	71	71	71
Border segments	50	50	50	50
Bandwidth	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km

Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. *Notes:* All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include border segment and district fixed effects as well as exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km²), and utilize a local linear running variable of either distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment or longitude and latitude. I also control for municipal size (km²). Units of observation are municipalities. Capital loss indicates whether a municipality has any observed abandoned or destroyed mills, mines, quarries, factories, breweries, or distilleries. Other urban loss indicates whether a municipality has any observed abandoned or destroyed rail stations, hotels and inns, cottages, churches, synagogues, castles, or courtyards.

synagogues, castles, and courtyards). Table 8 shows that the probability that capital loss is observed more than doubles at the MAL, holding municipal size and geographic factors such as ruggedness fixed, with somewhat smaller increases observed for other urban loss.³⁴

As the data are generated by a large number of users, giving rise to potential measurement error and especially observational selection for areas with higher probabilities of abandonment (i.e. the borderlands), these coefficients should be taken with caution. However, the presence of significant capital loss in the borderlands is corroborated by a large and well-established historical literature (Radvanovský, 2001; Glassheim, 2001; 2016; Gerlach, 2017). Nevertheless, other potential issues threaten the interpretation of such capital loss as a causal channel. In particular, one important concern is that, rather than resulting from the expulsion, some of the capital loss observed in Table 8 may actually have preceded it and thus influenced the borderlands’ subsequent development independent of it.

For instance, Germany’s annexation of the borderlands during WWII would have left it vulnerable to bombings by the Allied Powers. To address this, Figure A.3 in the Supplemental Material confirms bombings to be few and concentrated around major urban areas regardless of region. At the same time, the end of WWII saw Czechoslovakia’s liberation by Soviet and U.S. forces. Historical evidence suggests that some areas experienced a loss of capital at that time. In particular, violent and appropriative behavior was reported to have taken place by Soviet Red Army soldiers (Gerlach, 2017). This might have hurt the

³⁴See Table A.22 in the Supplemental Material for probit estimates.

borderlands’ development independent of the expulsion (Feigenbaum et al, 2019).

Unfortunately, no data exist regarding capital flight during Soviet liberation. One can, however, test for differences in capital loss and subsequent convergence by dividing the Czech lands into Red Army and U.S. liberation zones (see Figures A.15-16) and testing for heterogeneous effects. Doing this, I do find some evidence that U.S. zones have better long-run economic outcomes relative to Soviet ones, as in Oschner (2017). However, I find no evidence that being in a Soviet zone exacerbates borderland effects, suggesting that any initial plundering of borderland capital that took place by Red Army forces is not driving the main expulsion effect. For these results, see Table A.23 in the Supplemental Material.

Altogether, this sheds some light on why effects persist here yet may not after other population shocks (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; 2008). In other settings, pre-existing property rights may help coordinate economic activity back to its initial equilibrium (Nunn, 2014). In contrast, those displaced by the expulsion here were not the same as those who might restore prior economic geography thereafter, leaving large amounts of property unowned in the interim. As a result, other factors such as physical capital were also removed from the borderlands after the expulsion, making convergence even less probable.

5.3 Urban decay

Today, over 1000 abandoned settlements dot the borderlands, while countless others remain sparsely populated seven decades since the expulsion of their former German residents (Glassheim, 2015). The origins of such “urban decay” can be traced to the immediate post-expulsion period, when smaller towns failed to attract enough settlers, while local authorities and “gold-diggers” exploited and looted confiscated German property.

To see this, I modify the LBC approach above to estimate differences between relative outcomes in 1930, prior to the expulsion, and those in mid-1947, after the expulsion and the borderlands’ initial resettlement had wound down but prior to the advent of communism in 1948. In particular, I adopt a “local” difference-in-differences (DD) model,

$$y_{d,t} = \alpha + \beta InBorderlands_d \times \mathbb{Y}_{1947} + f(location_{dt}) + \mathbf{X}_d' \Gamma_t + \mathbb{Y}_t + \Sigma_{bt} + \Delta_d + \varepsilon_{d,t},$$

which is equivalent to differencing (1) across years t , indicated by the dummy $\mathbb{Y}_t$, using time-invariant district fixed effects Δ_d while allowing the effects of the running variable $f(location_{dt})$, border segments Σ_{bt} , and geography $\mathbf{X}_d$ to vary over time. This estimates the effect of being in the borderlands at the MAL in mid-1947 *relative* to the same effect in 1930. I use the same running polynomials and bandwidths as above, with robustness for these and other short-run outcomes in Tables A.29-32 in the Supplemental Material.

TABLE 9: URBAN CHANGE AROUND THE MAL, 1930-47

	ln Population density	Agricultural sector	Secondary sector	Transport sector	Business sector
	(1)	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(2d)
Δ_{47-30} ln borderlands (linear in distance)	-.190 (.048)***	4.046 (1.868)**	-.311 (1.810)	-.221 (.400)	-1.306 (.515)**
R^2	.919	.59	.76	.673	.635
Δ_{47-30} ln borderlands (linear in x and y)	-.296 (.028)***	6.390 (1.129)***	-3.389 (1.064)***	-.003 (.294)	-1.959 (.244)***
R^2	.914	.584	.748	.685	.625
Mean dep. var. in 1930	4.738 (.703)	27.921 (13.711)	41.238 (12.950)	3.472 (1.962)	6.067 (2.677)
Observations	330	330	330	330	330
Clusters	98	98	98	98	98
Border segments	24	24	24	24	24
Bandwidth	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km	25 km
Year	1930-47	1930-47	1930-47	1930-47	1930-47

Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. *Notes:* All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include census year, year $\times$ border segment, and judicial district fixed effects as well as exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km²), all interacted with census year, and utilize a local linear running variable of either distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment and year or longitude and latitude interacted with year. Coefficients denote differences in discontinuities in 1947 from the corresponding estimates in Tables 2 and 3. Units of observation are judicial districts.

I begin by estimating a local DD for population density. Whereas differences in population density between the regions were relatively smooth and stable over time prior to the expulsion, as shown in Table 2, Table 9 shows that population density had become relatively lower in the borderlands after the expulsion and remained as such following the large-scale resettlement discussed above – even in easily accessible areas near the MAL. This is consistent with the historical literature, in which only 1.3 million settlers had arrived and remained by mid-1947 (Daněk, 1995; Gerlach, 2017). In combination with Czechs living in the borderlands pre-1938, its population was still below two thirds its prior size.

This suggests that the expulsion of the Germans indeed triggered a “de-urbanization” of the borderlands as a region, relative to the interior, with the region becoming more rural *on average* relative to before.³⁵ To explore this further, I consider a second important dimension of urban development: sectoral structure. Columns (2a-d) in Table 9 show a structural shift toward agriculture occurring alongside declines in density by the time expulsion and resettlement had concluded in mid-1947. I estimate a relative increase in the share of the labor force in the borderlands working in agriculture of about 4 pp at the MAL – about a 15% increase in the size of the local agricultural labor force from 1930. Much of this shift

³⁵This is not to say the borderlands experienced a de-urbanization *within*. In fact, the relative decline of many of its smaller towns likely left a *higher* percentage of its residents in large urban areas.

TABLE 10: LONG-RUN PANEL, 1921-2011

	ln Population density	Agricultural sector	Industry	Service sector
	(1)	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)
In borderlands×1921	-.011 (.015)	-.954 (.739)	.115 (.691)	.835 (.323)**
In borderlands×1930	0	0	0	0
In borderlands×1947	-.310 (.036)***	3.277 (.847)***	–	-1.466 (.662)**
In borderlands×1950	-.298 (.036)***	3.725 (.889)***	-2.676 (1.026)**	-1.272 (.844)
In borderlands×1961	-.299 (.054)***	–	-4.639 (1.238)***	–
In borderlands×1970	-.272 (.056)***	3.025 (.982)***	-4.297 (1.201)***	-.284 (.904)
In borderlands×1980	-.238 (.058)***	3.186 (1.125)***	-3.539 (1.339)***	-.862 (.862)
In borderlands×1991	-.214 (.060)***	3.148 (1.200)**	-3.975 (1.450)***	-.523 (.842)
In borderlands×2001	-.203 (.059)***	2.839 (1.600)*	-1.840 (1.998)	-2.282 (.952)**
In borderlands×2011	-.245 (.056)***	2.845 (1.748)	-2.621 (2.057)	-5.050 (1.070)***
R^2	.423	.872	.719	.958
Observations	730	657	657	657
Clusters	73	73	73	73

Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. *Notes:* All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and include census year and district fixed effects as well as controls for longitude, latitude, and each interacted with census year. Units of observation are districts (1991 boundaries). To construct common district boundaries used for this panel analysis and others, I use the harmonization procedure described in the Supplemental Material. All other districts are included in this regression, with districts assigned to the region with >50% of their area. See Table A.24 for a more restrictive approach.

stems from a shrunken business sector, i.e. finance, insurance, trade, and other commerce.

These patterns also persist over the long-run, i.e. through the communist period as well as since transition. Because more highly-aggregated district boundaries were established after the coup, I adopt a more “global” DD approach that uses all districts to compare differences in interior and borderland districts’ population density and sectoral structure from 1921 to 2011 relative to pre-expulsion differences.³⁶ Table 10 shows that, while differences in density appear to shrink somewhat during the communist period due to relatively high fertility offsetting negative net migration,³⁷ they have grown since liberalization, suggesting that state investments under central planning may have cushioned the borderlands somewhat.

³⁶To aggregate districts, I utilize a harmonization approach previously used in [Hornbeck \(2010\)](#) and [Bazzi et al \(2020\)](#). This procedure is also used in Table A.24, which replicates this global DD using only districts within 50 km of the MAL while dropping those that overlap it, and described in the Supplemental Material.

³⁷See Table A.25 for migration patterns using the same DD approach.

I also find the shift toward agriculture to be persistent, offset by growing industry differences. This reflects how, after resettlement wound down in the late 1940s, migration *out* of the borderlands occurred by many skilled workers as “administrative conflicts, a lack of suitable settlers, labor shortages, and property squabbles” beset them (Gerlach, 2017, 14).³⁸ After transition – when state investments in steel, coal, and other industries were reduced and their labor forces transitioned into sectors like banking and the auto industry – industry differences shrank and service sector differences widened (Illner and Andrie, 1994). This mirrors Table 5, in which borderland municipalities in 2011 showed lower employment shares in many service-based sectors.³⁹ Hence, the data show that the expulsion of the Germans generated an immediate urban divergence within in the Czech lands, at the expense of the former Sudetenland, that persists long after the conclusion of intervening shocks.

Beyond showing that urban decay followed from the expulsion, implications of such decay as it pertains to the persistence of effects can be drawn using the same dataset as used above for capital loss but for abandoned urban areas (i.e. villages, settlements, hamlets, and parts of towns). In Table A.26 in the Supplemental Material, I show that having one documented abandoned urban area per square km coincides with additional relative increases in unemployment and decreases in education in the borderlands. This suggests that a decrease in the size and number of local markets as entailed by this sustained loss of cities fed into declines in local demand for labor and human capital, hindering subsequent upward mobility in those places. Combined with the persistent time paths of effects for density and interregional migration in Tables 10 and A.25, this is consistent with theoretical work in economic geography linking differences in regional agglomeration with labor market disparities, reinforced by labor mobility and pooling (Epifani and Gancia, 2005; Francis, 2009), and speaks to the overall coincidence of regional agglomeration and unemployment disparities observed in Section 4.

5.4 Regional human capital inequalities

Recall that there was little difference in average literacy around the MAL prior to the expulsion of the Germans. However, compositional changes associated with post-expulsion migration and the borderlands’ subsequent urban decay may have generated differences in human capital between the regions, making it relatively more concentrated in the interior. This in turn could have fed back into sectoral change (Moretti, 2004), locking in human capital inequalities between the regions over the longer-run. Such a pattern would be consistent

³⁸See Figure A.9 for a heatmap of out-migration by 1950 districts.

³⁹In contrast, agriculture has tended to remain dispersed smoothly through the MAL over time, despite still being relatively more prominent in the borderlands “globally.”

TABLE 11: SHORT-RUN EDUCATIONAL EFFECTS, MID-1947

	Primary & lower secondary		Upper secondary		Tertiary
	Enrollment, general ₅₋₁₄	Enrollment, civic ₁₀₋₁₄	Enrollment, agricultural ₁₅₋₁₉	Enrollment, vocational ₁₅₋₁₉	Enrollment, college ₁₅₋₂₄
	(1a)	(1b)	(2a)	(2b)	(3)
In borderlands (linear in distance)	5.651 (.967)***	-8.204 (2.661)***	7.174 (1.817)***	-12.980 (5.15)**	-2.926 (.449)***
R^2	.867	.589	.485	.241	.734
In borderlands (linear in x and y)	6.959 (.728)***	-7.669 (2.395)***	5.562 (1.374)***	-6.293 (4.398)	-2.574 (.374)***
R^2	.86	.591	.517	.214	.724
Mean dep. var. in interior	52.694 (2.398)	57.142 (5.513)	5.762 (3.951)	17.031 (11.208)	3.215 (1.358)
Observations	115	115	115	115	115
Border segments	16	16	16	16	16
Bandwidth	50 km	50 km	50 km	50 km	50 km
Year	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947

Robust standard errors reported in brackets, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. *Notes:* All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include border segment fixed effects as well as exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km²), and utilize a local linear running variable of either distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment or longitude and latitude. Units of observation are political districts. All outcomes represent enrollment in a given type of schooling as a share (out of 100) of the relevant age population.

with the historical narrative that settlers were disproportionately unskilled (Radvanovský, 2001; Glassheim, 2016), as well as the finding that the borderlands is less educated today.

While no data exist on educational attainment for the postwar Czech lands until 1961, some evidence that the borderlands already had lower human capital post-resettlement can be found by examining regional school enrollment patterns in mid-1947, after the main waves of expulsion and resettlement had wound down. Until the coup in 1948, Czechoslovakia had 8 years of compulsory education. For primary education, children attended a general school (*obecná škola*) for 5 years. Following this, one could either complete his or her education with 3 more years at a general school or pursue a more advanced lower secondary education. Commonly, this entailed attending a civic school (*měšt'anská škola*) for 3 years. This in turn was a prerequisite for subsequent upper secondary (e.g. vocational) education.⁴⁰

Upon examining differences in school enrollment in mid-1947 between the post-expulsion, post-resettlement borderlands and nearby interior areas, I find that rates of enrollment in general schools among the relevant age group were significantly *higher* in the borderlands. Given that all primary school-age children were enrolled in general schools regardless of region, this had to have been driven by differences at the lower secondary level – namely, a greater share of 10-14 year olds in the borderlands forgoing civic schooling in favor of the

⁴⁰For more, see Greger et al (2012) and <https://is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/download/120238971>.

terminal general school track. Consistent with this, I find that civil school enrollment rates among 10-14 year olds were significantly *lower* in the borderlands in mid-1947 relative to those of nearby interior areas. This can be seen in Table 11.

This also means that there would have been relatively fewer students in the borderlands going on to pursue more advanced education. Column (3) confirms strikingly lower rates of college enrollment in the borderlands relative to the interior in mid-1947, about a 90% decrease from crossing the MAL. There were also differences in the *types* of schooling being pursued among advanced students. To show this, I examine enrollment data from mid-1947 for two common types of upper secondary schools: basic vocational schools (*základní odborná škola*) and agricultural folk schools (*lidová škola zemědělská*). The former provided education specific to a variety of trades, while the latter were meant for those going into agriculture. Examining these, I observe another striking trend, which mirrors the sectoral changes observed above: while basic vocational schooling was significantly less popular among those living in the borderlands in mid-1947 relative to those in nearby interior areas, enrollment in agricultural folk schools among the relevant age group was >100% higher. This suggests that even among those in the borderlands who *did* go on to pursue advanced education, there was a tendency to invest in agricultural skills over other, more technical skills.

Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that those who selected into the borderlands after the expulsion of 3 million Germans had less demand for advanced and technical education, relative to those who stayed in nearby interior areas. In contrast, I do not find consistent evidence that these early patterns were driven by supply-side factors. Table A.27 in the Supplemental Material shows that, while the borderlands' civic schools may have had slightly fewer teachers per pupil relative to nearby interior ones, its general and agricultural schools exhibited similar shortages despite having higher relative enrollment, while its vocational schools had *greater* teacher-pupil ratios on average. Moreover, the college enrollment measure in Table 11 exclusively measures demand, insofar as the location of college enrollment is not restricted to the district of observation in the data.

Hence, despite Germans and Czechs previously having similar levels of education, the expulsion of the Germans generated a loss of human capital in former-German areas beginning with compositional changes they endured during their resettlement. Of course, it is difficult to discern to what extent this was driven by a lack of skilled workers selecting into the borderlands versus fewer incentives to become skilled there due to a lack of skill-intensive sectors. More than likely there was a feedback between the two, reinforced by more permanent labor market changes. Consistent with this, long-run trends show alongside the sectoral changes in Table 10 downturns in education that persist to today (see Table A.28). Alongside changes in density, this is also consistent with recent theoretical and empirical work

in economic geography, showing human capital spillovers to be an important force driving urban and labor market density (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Moretti, 2004).

5.5 Additional channels

This paper shows a persistent spatial divergence in local development within the Czech lands following the 1945 expulsion of 3 million Germans from its borderlands. It has also discussed the origins of these patterns, which emerged immediately following the expulsion and persist decades after. That being said, there may be other forces which contributed to the persistence of or variation in such differences. I now consider three additional channels.

Natural geography

The analysis thus far controls for locational fundamentals, with physical geography being smooth through the MAL. Alternative specifications using only geographically cohesive (i.e. flat through the MAL) parts of the sample yield similar long-run effects, as shown in Table A.15 in the Supplemental Material. Yet strong locational fundamentals may nonetheless have helped mitigate the expulsion’s long-run effects within the borderlands. Since access to water may contribute to economic performance through improved agriculture or transport, I expand the analysis by interacting the treatment variable (and running variable, where applicable) with a mean-normalized river density control, which indicates km of waterways per square km in each municipality. Estimates suggest a possible, albeit noisy, attenuation effect from the presence of rivers on some long-run effects. These can be found in Table A.33. I find minimal evidence of any such effect for ruggedness.

Central planning

The expulsion and the borderlands’ resettlement occurred prior to the communist coup of 1948, when Czechoslovakia’s labor economy still operated to a large extent via the market mechanism (Bernàšek, 1970). However, it is important to consider to what extent central-planning institutions helped *preserve* this divergence post-1947. If signs of convergence are observed as having occurred around the MAL since transition, then it might mean that this persistence had more to do with active central-planning decisions, whereas local losses in e.g. density may not have persisted to the same extent in a market economy.

To test this, I consider in Table A.34 trends in relevant outcomes between 2001 and 2011, after the end of communism and the restructuring of the 1990s. Differences in density and unemployment remain highly stable near the MAL. I find similar stability for sector shares, although the construction sector declines somewhat *more* as a share of the labor force in the

borderlands relative to the interior in both specifications. Yet overall, and despite large-scale structural change since transition, differences remain remarkably flat. This, combined with the overall persistence of patterns during communism and through transition (e.g. those in Table 10), downplays the importance of central-planning institutions. That being said, the communist regime itself plays a key role here, as discussed in Section 5.2.

Market access and international relations

For various reasons, the borderlands may have been a less appealing place to live during the Cold War: for instance, its proximity to West Germany and Austria (e.g. due to damaged trade networks, as well as poor international relations and fear of expellee return), as well as economic isolation associated with the Iron Curtain in places closer to Poland and East Germany (Redding and Sturm, 2008).

I begin by examining whether living in the borderlands ever entailed greater economic isolation in areas near the MAL. To measure this, I look for differences in the density of railways through the MAL in 1930, 1940, 1960, and today (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016). I find no evidence of decreased market access in the borderlands relative to the interior in any time period. Furthermore, upon comparing effects in areas closer to the Eastern Bloc (East Germany and Poland) versus West Germany and Austria, I do not find smoothness to vary across space.⁴¹ Note that this does not imply a lack of increased isolation closer to international borders. Indeed, one advantage of my identification strategy is that borderland areas close to MAL tend to be quite far from international borders. Hence, economic isolation does not seem to be driving short- or long-run local effects, either overall or associated with e.g. the Iron Curtain. These results can be found in Table A.35 in the Supplemental Material.

It is still possible that proximity to West Germany and Austria would have entailed other economic disadvantages, given the tensions of the postwar era. For instance, after WWII, the Czechoslovak government intentionally kept parts of the borderlands on the West German border emptied as a military buffer zone (Illner and Andrlé, 1994). Table A.36 shows several of the baseline long-run regressions with an interaction term for whether a municipality was closer to Eastern Bloc areas prior to 1989. I find no differential effects here either.

6 Discussion and conclusion

For centuries, Czech- and German-speaking peoples lived alongside each other, growing the whole of the Czech lands into one of the most developed parts of Europe by the early 20th

⁴¹See Figure A.17 in the Supplemental Material for these maps.

century (Klein and Ogilvie, 2016). Yet the rise of nationalism and the events of WWII changed that forever, culminating in the expulsion of 3 million Germans in 1945. This paper documents how that event continues to influence the relative development of former-German areas and economic geography of the Czech lands more than half a century later.

Though this analysis has focused extensively on how these effects emerged and persisted, numerous questions inevitably remain. For instance, what role did communism play in driving persistence relative to what would have persisted regardless? On one hand, the persistence of effects through transition and the relative stability of trends around the former German “language border” today suggests that central planning was unnecessary *ex post* for persistence. On the other hand, this paper documents how the communists extracted capital and raw materials from the borderlands following its initial de-urbanization, as discussed in Section 5. As such, it remains unclear how effects might have differed had Czechoslovakia been more like Austria or Finland during the Cold War. Future work should delve deeper into how this period of central planning matters for long-run effects (i.e. post-transition). This would tell us more about both the channels of persistence in this particular setting, as well as the extent to which policy can influence long-run development more generally.

External validity also remains a concern in the literature on forced migration, as expulsion and similar events often occur during wartime and in poorly institutionalized settings. Given the continued importance of studying forced migration, future research should examine and compare effects in a variety of institutional and historical settings, including forced migration as a result of non-political factors such as climate change. Moreover, household-level data collection and analysis is needed. This should entail examining narrow areas around the former language border, as in Karaja and Rubin (2017), to better understand the choice to resettle the borderlands as well as transmission mechanisms at play at a more micro level.

This paper provides several important lessons for understanding forced migration, at a time when the number of forcibly displaced worldwide is about 70 million. First, it illustrates how such events may affect not only targeted groups but also have long-term implications for development and regional inequality within the origin economy. Moreover, it shows that forced migration can have strong and persistent effects even when compositional factors such as human capital are similar across treated and control areas. This is no trivial insight. While previous research has focused on expulsions involving relatively high-skilled minorities, forced migration has plagued groups from many backgrounds throughout history. This should give political leaders pause when considering the displacement of any minority group, as doing so may leave a lasting mark on the places left behind.

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